Abstract. The paper analyses the impact of the board of supervisors capital on validity of monitoring, which includes monitoring the company finance and the behavior of harming company benefit from directors and senior management based on resource independence theory and resource-based view. The members in board of supervisors have human capital or social capital that will reduce the harm behavior efficiently. Meanwhile increasing the width and depth in members of board of supervisors can strengthen validity of monitoring finance.
Introduction
In 2014, the new company law has improvement and supplement on composition , certification and functions of board of supervisors, which confirms the necessity and strengthens the function of monitoring of board of supervisors, leading to a heated discussion among academics on how improving validity of monitoring from board of supervisors. Recent researches focus on impact of setting of board of supervisors on the validity of its monitoring, such as the scale, composition, times of meeting, shareholding ratio of its members, independence and so on . In fact, differences in the members' skills and social connection net cause different monitoring result, even the two companies have the similar characteristics in settings of board of supervisors. In addition, stakeholder theory says the company belongs to all stakeholders. Strength in skills and social connection of members, voted by different benefit subjects, probably influences arm of monitoring from different stakeholders' views. Then which is important for the listed company to choose supervisors, their human capital or social capital? And does the choice can influence validity of monitoring? In the paper, we regard supervisors as resource input, and think of human capital ,consisted of skill, experience, social connection net and ability of information-acquiring, and social capital as board of supervisors capital, which is taken as resource monitored, to discuss the impact of heterogeneity of the resource of board of supervisors on monitoring validity. All above are based on resource-based view, input-output view, the hypothesis of human heterogeneity, and background of recent law system.
Review of International Research and Domestic Research
The research of international academics about validity of monitoring of board of supervisors mainly contains present situation of business survival, effect of outside independence supervisors, composition of members and its ratio. 
Impact of outside factor
The conclusions are various on the view of effect of monitoring of board of supervisors. Li and Wu (2003) say earning management, accounting firm scale and policies make the board of supervisors not monitoring totally. Li and Wang (2005) find board of supervisors has positive influence on financial security, and negative influence on percentage of the first majority shareholder, which indicates the company governance has important influence on validity of monitoring, so we can improve the validity by optimizing ownership structure.
Impact of inside factor
Some academics research validity from the view of board scale, independence, knowledge structure, knowledge level and behaviors. Liu (2004) (2009) find the board scale has a outstanding positive correlation to quality of disclosure, and the number of worker supervisors has a negative correlation to it through researching governance of board of supervisors and quality of information disclosure. Han and Shen (2010) take percentage of shareholders of supervisors, percentage of supervisors taking salary from the company, number of supervisors and independence supervisors, term of chairman's office as characteristics to research validity of board of supervisors on the view of accounting information quality, and draw a conclusion that the validity is seriously limited.
In summary, in the view of resource distribution, present researches don't explain the validity or invalidity of monitoring of the board of supervisors. While we can see, the validity of monitoring and finance-monitoring researches, in the view of characteristics of board of supervisors, are more and more. It will be more helpful to understand and investigate the validity of monitoring deeply and absolutely that regarding board of supervisors capital as resource-input and investigating impact of different benefit subjects on validity of monitoring. As a result, the view of distribution of monitoring resource is the future trend to research the impact of board of supervisors capital on validity of monitoring.
The Contents of Board of Supervisor Capital
In 1978, Pfeffer and Salancik put forward resource dependence theory, which says resource is helpful for business to survive an development by reducing dependence in outside environment, uncertainty and transaction cost. Supervisors use own professional knowledge, advanced management ideas, and rich social connection to monitor financial operations , directors' and senior management's behaviors efficiently , reduce violation behaviors, provide a legal guarantee, build a kind public image and increase possibility of valuable resource-acquiring. In 1984, in Wernerfelt's resource-based view, he took a business as a collection of resource, and suggested variety of resource and ability is the source of business competition advantage, which focused on variety of resource and strategic factors market. The board of supervisors usually consists of accountants, lawyers, senior management from other business, ex-officer of government, experts from school and persons with important professional knowledge, experience, and skills that are superior, then they also has rich social connection. So the human capital and the social capital of board of supervisors is a exceptional resource and ability. On the aspect of team, capital of board of supervisors is the important resource-monitoring in the business.
Using the definition of board of directors capital from Hillman and Dalziel(2003) for reference and being based on setting and members composition of board of supervisors in China, I think the board of supervisor capital measures the ability of providing resource-monitoring for business from board of supervisors, including human capital and social capital. The human capital is a collection of knowledge, skills and capability provided by all supervisors. The social capital is human relationship inside and outside, including a potential resource from human relationship ahead.
According the boundary and function, the social capital can be divided into inside social capital and outside social capital. The inside is built by understanding among supervisors and between supervisors and management. The outside is from a kind relationship between supervisors and others in the industry. They have different characteristics providing different types of resource for business. But these two types of social capital restrict each other in a certain extent. If the social capital is constant, the more inside social capital the board of supervisors has, the less outside social capital it has, vice versa. According to the member of the board of supervisors heterogeneity and embedded in the extent of the industry, the board of supervisor capital has two dimension, including width and depth. The width involves difference of supervisors' education background, in-office background, career, age, and term of taking office, and heterogeneity of the identity as chained supervisor and taking office in other business. The depth means degree of supervisors embedded in the industry by his identity as chained supervisor and experience in other business.
Impact of Board of Supervisor Capital on Validity of Monitoring
For researching the validity of monitoring, we need to define the function of monitoring. At present, the scholars disagree with each other about this problem. Their research is mainly about increasing economic benefit, reducing agency cost. To improve the enterprise internal management and evaluation board governance effect. Even though national laws regulate authority of the board of supervisors, authority is different from function which is limited in the range of authority. According to the Company Law revised in 2006, the paper indicates the validity of monitoring on the aspects of directors' and senior management's behavior of harming business benefit and finance-monitoring.
Research on the impact of board of supervisors capital on validity of monitoring directors' and senior management's behavior of harming business benefit
In the more than 20 years' development, Chinese capital market appears lots of violations, which is the sequel caused by quality of distribution of board of supervisors capital in Chinese listed company. Referring to irregular acts disclosed by Securities and Exchange Commission, we can find the irregular behaviors focus on buying stocks irregularly, changing the usage of capital privately, contributing irregularly, assets occupied by the majority stockholder, rigging stock price, being listed cheated, guaranteeing irregularly and speculating irregularly. If supervisors have rich human capital or social capital, they can have enough knowledge and skills to monitor CEOs, estimate the design and executive of strategy efficiently, reduce moral risk causing from asymmetric information, asymmetric pay, affording asymmetry, limited terms of office and limited liability, decrease management's opportunism and its occupation of stockholders and creditors. The kind relationship that supervisors build respectively between the management inside and others in the industry helps to inspect intension of directors and management and finds directors and management may make against the company's future behavior earlier. It is evident that the supervisors with rich human capital or social capital or both can reduce, even avoid the directors' and senior management's behaviors of harming benefit of the company.
Research on impact of board of supervisors capital on validity of finance-monitoring
The financial irregular behaviors of listed companies are fictitious profit, fictitious assets, delaying disclosure fictitious statement and material misstatements and so on. Academics' view vary aspects of cancel and reinforce. We think the difference is caused by neglecting the view of board of supervisors capital. The width of capital, the heterogeneity of members, helps supervisors estimate the present finance situation and the future development trend, conclude probable financial analysis, increase the stability of earnings, reduce the management's financial manipulation. The depth of capital reinforce supervisors' career experience in the industry, judge the rationality of the business operation on the view of the industry in order to monitor the finance efficiently. 
﹡
Data from Juchao information net and CSMAR database.
The validity of finance-monitoring focuses on the supervisors' attitude to independence opinion of financial information. We regard supervisors' support for nonstandard auditing opinion as substitute variable for validity of finance-monitoring. Before implement of the new company law, from 2009 to 2012, Table 1 presents the boards of supervisors of the companies in A stock market support 144 pieces of the auditing opinions, 32.65 percentage of the total. After implement of the new company law, from 2013 to 2016, supervisors support 203 pieces of the auditing opinions, 42.83 percentage of the total. The statistics indicates that after implement of the new company law, supervisors' attitude of support for outside auditing opinions has increased 10 percentage points by supplement and improvement of composition, certification and authority of supervisor. The financial supervision effect of the board of supervisors has been improved. So from the total operation situation of the listed companies, improving structure of the board of supervisors of capital increases the validity of finance-monitoring. However, as the result of resource disproportion of the boards of supervisors in our listed companies, the validity is different, which leads to academics various opinions on the validity of finance-monitoring.
